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If it were possible to transduce political energy into thermal energy, then CETA would have considerably heated
large parts of EU-Europe within the past two years. After the latest events, Wallonia would probably be able to
grow bananas.
All this political energy, the thousands of hours of negotiation with Canada and about Canada, at political party
conventions, in Parliament, before the Federal Constitutional Court – all in vain?
Well, this is what democracy is all about, opponents of CETA and globalization now announce. The latter can
hardly believe their luck that at the eleventh hour and for intra-Belgian and only distantly related reasons –
arguably only for the sake of a regional politician’s ambitions -, the invidious CETA seems about to fold. What is
overlooked is that this uncompromising veto position of a regional group could potentially oppose pretty much
any agreement, including the ones for the protection of the environment, of the consumer or even of human
rights.
Democracy, therefore, is not the issue here. Rather, the CETA/Wallonia issue is a vivid demonstration of
overfederalization that leaves not only Belgium but the entire European Union unable to act. A minority rules the
majority and the result is humiliation, the disgrace of the European project within and without. Anyone who still
does not feel at least slightly concerned because of this development has clearly failed to understand the
significance of European Integration for a peaceful side-by-side in Europe.
What, then, is the problem? Once more, and as so often in the CETA debate, those inclined to oversimplify the
situation are the quickest to announce their superficial analysis of the situation. To design CETA as a mixed
agreement was already a mistake, some people tell us now: People should have listened to the Commission
which wisely advocated an EU-only agreement until July 2016.
A more short-sighted approach is hardly imaginable. After all, we are not dealing solely with a political question
that can be decided either way. CETA includes areas that fall outside the EU’s competences. This is why the
agreement is a mixed one in which Member States come in as additional public international law parties to the
agreement, filling in the gaps regarding competences.
Beyond that, I still believe that there are also sound political reasons for a mixed agreement. There is an intrinsic
value to Member State participation. The legitimacy provided by the European level is not (yet) sufficient to carry
an agreement such as CETA, once critical discussions have started. The European Commission has completely
underestimated this issue. Meanwhile, the Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, essentially very similar to
CETA, has entered into force without any complaints – one of the many irrational elements in this whole thing.
Still: the intense debate in the past months caused by the involvement of the Member States (mixed agreement)
has in the end led to a significant improvement of various parts of the agreement with Canada. In this view,
CETA was on a good track to becoming an example of an, albeit cumbersome, also intensive and ultimately
successful multilevel democratic process. Until the Wallonians came, that is.
The moment when striving for improvement turns into a logjam marks the end of the democratic process and the
intrinsic democratic value of the multilevel process evaporates. Wallonia does not provide any additional
arguments against CETA that are regionally specific or that have not yet been sufficiently discussed and actually
been rendered insubstantial through explanations and clarifications.
CETA without Belgium
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There is, however, still a solution should Wallonia refuse to relent.
Why not simply close the agreement without Belgium? CETA as a mixed agreement between Canada, the
European Union and 27 out of 28 Member States.
Nowhere is it written that mixed agreements need to be signed by all member states. An example: if the EU
wanted to conclude an agreement with a third country on services in close proximity to the beach, and if there
were gaps in the EU’s competences, it would be thinkable and indeed plausible to involve only those Member
States that actually have a beach.
CETA without Belgium: in technical terms, this could easily be implemented. As yet, this does not even concern
the entry into force but the signature of the agreement. In the opening lines, one would have to cross out
“Kingdom of Belgium” and elaborate in Article 1.1 CETA that “Member States” in the context of CETA refers to
those Member States of the EU who participate in the agreement. The passages concerning Belgium would have
to be removed from the annex and shelved for Belgium’s potential future accession. In Article 30.10 CETA
concerning a possible future EU Member State joining CETA, a sentence on the future accession of a current
Member State could be added.
Didn’t the Wallonians say – after 6 years of negotiations – that they need “more time”? Well, they would have all
the time in the world. They could sort things out and join CETA in 6 months or 6 years. But the majority could
move on. Sounds quite democratic.
Those parts of CETA within the competences of the Member States would then not apply to Belgium. The parts
within the competences of the EU, however, would. Since the major part of CETA – quantitatively as well as
qualitatively speaking – is within the competences of the Union, the practical consequences of such an
arrangement would be limited. A precondition would of course be Canada’s consent to such an unusual
construct.
In the end, this would only mirror that, on the European level, the by far more important European part of CETA
can be decided on in the Council of Ministers by qualified majority. Here, Member States do not have a veto.
Correspondingly, Belgium could be outvoted in the Council.
This solution is not some kind of magic formula solving once and for all the strenuous search for capacity to act in
the context of the EU common commercial policy. It can only be ultima ratio. The debates surrounding these
agreements, the negotiations within the Union and the search for a common ground would thus continue.
But, to quote Joseph Weiler’s famous formula, all this deliberating, debating and searching for compromise
would take place “under the shadow of the vote“, and no longer “under the shadow of the veto“.
European democracy instead of European vetocracy.
The author is counsel to the German Federal government in the CETA-case pending at the German
Constitutional Court. He expresses solely his personal opinion here.
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